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Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was first reported 
in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, and has since spread 
globally, resulting in >95,000 confirmed COVID-19 cases 
worldwide by March 5, 2020 (1). Singapore adopted a multi-
pronged surveillance strategy that included applying the case 
definition at medical consults, tracing contacts of patients with 
laboratory-confirmed COVID-19, enhancing surveillance 
among different patient groups (all patients with pneumonia, 
hospitalized patients in intensive care units [ICUs] with pos-
sible infectious diseases, primary care patients with influenza-
like illness, and deaths from possible infectious etiologies), 
and allowing clinician discretion (i.e., option to order a test 
based on clinical suspicion, even if the case definition was not 
met) to identify COVID-19 patients. Containment measures, 
including patient isolation and quarantine, active monitoring 
of contacts, border controls, and community education and 
precautions, were performed to minimize disease spread. As 
of March 5, 2020, a total of 117 COVID-19 cases had been 
identified in Singapore. This report analyzes the first 100 
COVID-19 patients in Singapore to determine the effective-
ness of the surveillance and containment measures. COVID-19 
patients were classified by the primary means by which they 
were detected. Application of the case definition and contact 
tracing identified 73 patients, 16 were detected by enhanced 
surveillance, and 11 were identified by laboratory testing 
based on providers’ clinical discretion. Effectiveness of these 
measures was assessed by calculating the 7-day moving average 
of the interval from symptom onset to isolation in hospital or 
quarantine, which indicated significant decreasing trends for 
both local and imported COVID-19 cases. Rapid identification 
and isolation of cases, quarantine of close contacts, and active 
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monitoring of other contacts have been effective in suppress-
ing expansion of the outbreak and have implications for other 
countries experiencing outbreaks.
On January 2, 2020, days after the first report of the disease from 
China, the ministry of health (MOH) in Singapore, a small island 
city-state in Southeast Asia with a population of approximately 
5.7 million, developed a local case definition (Supplementary 
Table, https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/85735) and advised all 
medical practitioners to be vigilant for suspected COVID-19 
patients (2). A confirmed case was defined as a positive test for 
SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, by reverse tran-
scription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) (3), or a positive 
viral microneutralization antibody test using a SARS-CoV-2 virus 
isolate (BetaCoV/Singapore/2/2020; GISAID accession 76 num-
ber EPI_ISL_407987) and conducted using previously published 
protocols (4). At hospitals, patients with suspected COVID-19 
received chest radiographs and RT-PCR testing on at least two 
nasopharyngeal swabs collected 24 hours apart (5). Physicians 
are mandated to report all suspected and confirmed COVID-19 
patients through a centralized disease notification system.
The case definition was updated five times following the 
outbreak’s start to adapt to the evolving global situation 
(Supplementary Table, https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/85735). 
The MOH carried out contact tracing around confirmed cases 
to identify persons who might have been infected. Contacts with 
fever (temperature ≥100.4°F [≥38°C]) or respiratory symptoms 
were transferred directly to a hospital for further evaluation and 
testing. Close contacts were defined as having close (within 6.6 ft 
[2 m]) and prolonged (generally ≥30 minutes) contact with the 
COVID-19 patient. Contacts at lower risk were persons who 
had some interactions with the COVID-19 patient for shorter 
periods of time. Asymptomatic close contacts were placed under 
compulsory quarantine for 14 days, and contacts at lower risk 
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were placed under active monitoring. All contacts were assessed 
by telephone for fever or respiratory symptoms by public health 
officials during the quarantine or monitoring period, thrice 
daily for close contacts and once daily for contacts at lower 
risk. Contacts who became symptomatic were transferred to 
a hospital. Surveillance was enhanced in late January 2020 by 
testing the following groups for COVID-19: 1) all hospitalized 
patients with pneumonia (later expanded to include patients 
with pneumonia evaluated in primary care settings); 2) ICU 
patients with possible infectious causes as determined by the 
physician; 3) patients with influenza-like illness at sentinel gov-
ernment and private primary care clinics included in the routine 
influenza surveillance network; and 4) deaths from possible 
infectious causes. In addition, medical practitioners could choose 
to test patients if there was clinical (e.g., prolonged respiratory 
illness with unknown cause) or epidemiologic (e.g., association 
with known clusters) suspicion.
The effectiveness of Singapore’s surveillance and containment 
efforts was assessed from the outbreak’s start until February 29 
by calculating the 7-day moving average of the interval from 
symptom onset to isolation in hospital or quarantine. This 
measure provides an indication of the time spent within the 
community when a person with COVID-19 is potentially infec-
tious. Differences in the percentages of cases detected through 
the different surveillance components were tested using the 
chi-squared or Fisher’s exact test. All analyses were conducted 
using R statistical software (version 3.5.1; The R Foundation).
Among the first 100 confirmed COVID-19 cases in Singapore, 
the average patient age was 42.5 years (median = 41 years; 
interquartile range [IQR] = 34–54 years) (Table). The majority 
(72%) of patients were aged 30–59 years, and 60% of patients 
were male. RT-PCR confirmed 99% of cases, and one case was 
confirmed by viral microneutralization testing. Twenty-four 
cases were imported, and the rest resulted from local transmis-
sion. Fifteen patients were ever in the ICU; no deaths have been 
reported to date. Contact tracing contributed to the primary 
detection of approximately half (53%) of COVID-19 patients. 
Another 20 (20%) patients were identified at general practi-
tioner clinics or hospitals because they met the case definition; 
16 were identified through enhanced surveillance (15 from 
pneumonia surveillance and one from the ICU), and another 
11 through medical providers’ clinical discretion. No patients 
were identified through surveillance for influenza-like illness. 
A significant difference was found in the percentage of cases 
detected by the various surveillance methods, depending on 
whether the cases were linked to another COVID-19 patient 
or by travel to China, compared with cases that could not be 
linked to another case (p<0.001). Among linked cases, the larg-
est proportion (62.7%) was detected through contact tracing, 
whereas among unlinked cases, the largest proportion of cases 
(58.8%) was detected through enhanced surveillance (Table). 
The earliest symptom onset date reported by a COVID-19 
patient was January 14 (Figure 1). The epidemic curve peaked 
on January 30, when nine patients were identified, before 
declining to two to five patients per day on February 11 and 
continuing forward. International importations accounted 
for a majority of cases at the outbreak’s start before more local 
cases were detected. The mean interval from symptom onset to 
TABLE. Characteristics of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases, by linkage to other known cases (N = 100) — Singapore, January–February 2020
Characteristic
No. (%) of COVID-19 cases
P-valueTotal Linked* Unlinked†
Age group (yrs)
<30 17 (17.0) 17 (20.5) 0 (—) 0.12
30–39 28 (28.0) 23 (27.7) 5 (29.4)
40–49 20 (20.0) 16 (19.3) 4 (23.5)
50–59 24 (24.0) 20 (24.1) 4 (23.5)
≥60 11 (11.0) 7 (8.4) 4 (23.5)
Sex
Male 60 (60.0) 46 (55.4) 14 (82.4) 0.06
Female 40 (40.0) 37 (44.6) 3 (17.6)
Ethnic group
Chinese 87 (87.0) 74 (89.2) 13 (76.5) 0.21
Indian 6 (6.0) 4 (4.8) 2 (11.8)
Malay 2 (2.0) 1 (1.2) 1 (5.9)
Other 5 (5.0) 4 (4.8) 1 (5.9)
Primary detection method
Contact tracing 53 (53.0) 52 (62.7) 1 (5.9) <0.001
Case definition at medical consult 20 (20.0) 16 (19.3) 4 (23.5)
Enhanced surveillance 16 (16.0) 6 (7.2) 10 (58.8)
Provider clinical discretion 11 (11.0) 9 (10.8) 2 (11.8)
* Patients who were epidemiologically linked to other COVID-19 patients or had recent travel to China.
† Patients whose source of infection could not be determined.
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FIGURE 1. Date of symptom onset and date of report for cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (N = 100), based on importation and 





















































* Linked patients defined as those who were found to be epidemiologically linked to other COVID-19 patients or who had recent travel to China.
† Unlinked patients defined as those whose source of infection could not be determined.
hospital isolation or quarantine was 5.6 days (median = 5 days; 
IQR = 2–8 days). The 7-day moving average of the interval 
from symptom onset to isolation declined significantly across 
the study period for both imported and local cases, from 9.0 
and 18.0 days to 0.9 and 3.1 days, respectively (p<0.001) 
(Figure 2). Among the 53 patients first identified through 
contact tracing, 13 (24.5%) were contacted on or before the 
date of symptom onset.
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FIGURE 2. Interval from symptom onset to isolation or hospitalization (7-day moving average), of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases 
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Discussion
In this assessment of the measures that Singapore, a small 
city-state, put in place to identify COVID-19 patients and 
contain disease spread in the early outbreak phase, approxi-
mately one quarter of cases were detected through enhanced 
surveillance among hospitalized patients with pneumonia and 
ICU patients (16 cases [16%]) and through providers’ clinical 
discretion (11 [11%]). A recent study considered Singapore to 
have the highest surveillance capacity for COVID-19 among all 
countries (6). The study estimated that if other countries had 
similar detection capacities as Singapore, the global number 
of imported cases detected would be 2.8 times higher than 
the observed current number. The surveillance methods in 
Singapore complemented one another to identify infected 
persons, with the overlapping components constituting safety 
nets; none of the methods alone would have detected all 
patients. The case definition was important for clinicians to 
use as a foundation, and active case finding around COVID-19 
patients through contact tracing was useful in detecting new 
patients early for isolation.
The enhanced surveillance measures of SARS-CoV-2 
testing of all patients with pneumonia, surveillance of ICU 
patients with severe illness and deaths potentially attributable 
to COVID-19, and clinical discretion in requesting testing 
were all important in detecting initially unlinked patients 
for further investigation. Adoption of multiple surveillance 
mechanisms can ensure broad coverage because each missed 
case can lead to chains of transmission that might be difficult 
to contain subsequently.
Singapore has implemented aggressive measures to contain 
local transmission of COVID-19. After an initial increase 
in locally transmitted cases, the number of newly identified 
cases decreased after approximately 1 month, determined by 
symptom onset dates. This decrease is likely a result of the early 
implementation of surveillance and detection measures while 
the numbers of patients were still small and individual-level 
containment was possible; a larger number of cases would 
have driven community transmission. The decline in the 7-day 
moving average of interval from onset to isolation in hospital 
and quarantine was also indicative of efforts to contain disease 
spread across time.
Singapore has also implemented other measures to reduce 
the spread of COVID-19. To prevent imported cases from 
seeding local transmission, border control measures included 
temperature screening initially for travelers on flights from 
Wuhan before expanding to include all travelers entering 
Singapore at air, sea, and land checkpoints (7). Short-term 
visitors with travel in the past 14 days to selected countries or 
regions (initially mainland China and later expanded to South 
Korea, northern Italy, and Iran) were denied entry; Singapore 
residents returning from these areas were placed under a man-
datory 14-day self-quarantine. To reduce community spread, 
public education messages were focused on personal hygiene 
and seeking early medical care and self-isolation when having 
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Summary
What is already known about this topic?
First detected in China in late 2019, coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) transmission has spread globally.
What is added by this report?
Singapore implemented a multipronged surveillance and 
containment strategy that contributed to enhanced case 
ascertainment and slowing of the outbreak. Based on review of 
the first 100 cases, the mean interval from symptom onset to 
isolation was 5.6 days and declined after approximately 
1 month.
What are the implications for public health practice?
A multipronged surveillance strategy could lead to enhanced 
case detection and reduced transmission of highly infectious 
diseases such as COVID-19.
respiratory symptoms. As of March 5, 2020, schools have not 
closed because there was no widespread community transmis-
sion in Singapore and few cases among children; precautionary 
measures such as reducing mixing across classes or schools 
have been implemented to limit possible disease transmission.
The findings in this report are subject to at least three limita-
tions. First, the 7-day moving average interval from symptom 
onset to isolation could fluctuate for recent dates as additional 
patients are detected and might be insufficient as a single 
measure to evaluate the effectiveness of containment. Further 
indicators to assess effectiveness of containment measures 
should be investigated. Nevertheless, the downward trend 
was significant from the outbreak’s start until early February. 
Second, the case detection methods were primarily focused on 
symptomatic patients. Further studies are needed to assess the 
number of asymptomatic patients in the community and their 
potential to transmit disease and whether additional measures 
targeting asymptomatic patients would have resulted in further 
case reductions. Finally, generalizability of results is limited 
because of the small sample size and lack of cases in settings 
such as long-term nursing facilities and health care settings. 
Singapore implemented strong surveillance and contain-
ment measures, which appear to have slowed the growth of the 
outbreak. These measures might be useful for detection and 
containment of COVID-19 in other countries that are expe-
riencing the start of local COVID-19 outbreaks. Singapore is 
a small island city-state, and nations with other characteristics 
might need to adapt and augment Singapore’s approaches to 
achieve the same level of effectiveness.
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